Consequently, data can be derived for only a few specific facilities, i.e., for some of the large airports. Moreover, publication of the hub studies did not begin until 1967 and this short time period is Inadequate for an accuracy assessment of the hub forrcastinR data in lieu of that of specific facilities.
(3) Due to this unavailability of forecasting data for hubs and for specific facilities, detailed analysis for forecasting accuracy was necessarily limited to the more readily available national estimates of the FAA. These forecasts, updated annually over the 10-year period from 1957 to the present, were consistently accurate on the short-term basis but highly inaccurate for the long-term (5 to 10 years).
Furthermore, the error has been that of under-estimation, which is increasing in a linear fashion for the longer term estimates.
(4) A comparison of future air travel projections from eight major forecasting studies showed very little consensus. The projections diverge over a wide range of expectations and in recent years all have proven to be too low when compared with the actual. Moreover, there does not seem to be any significantly better rationale for one methodology over another.
III. THE FAA FORECASTS

■
Travel forecasting, in general, can be categorized according to three levels: national, regional, and specific facility. The FAA has published annual national forecasts for air travel since the early ISSO's, but only recently has it published studies for those airport groups encompassed by the "air traffic hubs."* Because there is insufficient published forecasting data to analyze the hub forecasts for accuracy .'as well as an incomplete breakout of individual airports), thif analysis will examine the national forecasts. However, it is significant that the FAA bases the hub estimates on the national estimates, i.e., the four hub sizes ire determined by each community's percentage share of the national figures for total enplaned passengers (scheduled service of the fixed-wing operations of the domestic certificated route air carriers). *♦ The FAA's expectation for continuation of these ratios in the future is explained in the current large hub forecast report (Ref. 1):
Since a community's percentage share of the U, S. airline passenger market has proven relatively stable from year to year, and because passenger data are highly correlated with other measures of aeronautical activity such as aircraft operations, the hub structure serves as a valuable stratification method in forecasting local activity trends based on national data.... The forecast data indicate that only a slight increase in the percent of the respective U. S. totals will prevail for the Large Hubs in 1980.
The FAA projects a wide variety of aviation activity indicators covering passenger traffic, aircraft utilization and operations, and FAA workload with respect to the ATC and NAS activities. However, the basic planning statistic throughout the industry, and the most often used measure of growth, is the Revenue PassengerMile (RPM)-the measure of passengers carried in relation to distance traveled. * Passenger onplanements are also of great importance with respect to demand for airport facilities and services. Therefore, the scope of this analysis includes both the RPM and the passenger enplanement; it also includes both domestic and international segments of the total U.S. scheduled service of the certificated route air carriers.
A. HISTORICAL DATA
In assessing the accuracy of the FAA "official" estimates, it was necessary to survey a series of 15 annual forecast studies beginning with the first report published by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce in April 1954. However, the data were reported by calendar year through 1956 and by fiscal year from 1958 to the present (no projections were published in 1957). For this reason, comparison of the forecast results with subsequent actual events will be limited to the 10-year period from fiscal year 1959 through the base year of the present forecast period (FY 1968) . The basic format of the reports has remained substantially unchanged since the first report .ssued after the CAA became the FAA in 1958.
One revenue passenger transported one mile in revenue service. Revenue passenger-miles are computed by summation of the products of the revenue aircraft miles flown on each interairport hop multiplied by the number of revenue passengers carried on that hop. Tables 1 and 2 present the actual data since 1955 for annual volumes and rates of growth of U.S. passenger enplanements and revenue passenger-miles, broken down by the domestic and international operations of the scheduled service of the U.S. certificated route air carriers. The FAA reports these data on a fiscal year basis while the literature of the aviation community reports predominantly on a calendar year basis. For comparison, Table 3 parallels the FAA data by calendar year data (domestic RPM only). Inspection of these sets of data shows marked decrease in annual growth as a Examination of the data in Tables 1 and 2, taking Table 4 presents these data (including earlier estimates from 1954) for the domestic enplanement forecast series; Table 5 shows similar data for RPM's. For purposes of comparison, the historical data and rates of annual change are also shown. Figure 1 pijts the RPM data graphically in order to show (1) of the available data and subsequent correlation and regression analyses, the problem of projecting overall employment levels was transformed into that of finding an acceptable forecast of aircraft by types over the period under study. All such existing forecasts depended on projections of revenue passenger-miles and cargo tonmiles. ♦♦ However, differing assumptions regarding new aircraft types and introduction dates caused differences in the forecasts. Consequently, the study reviewed
The study was a Technical Assistance Project sponsored by the Kconomic Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
♦»
One short ton (2,000 pounds) transported one statute mile (5,280 feet). Ton-miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each interairport hop by the number of tons carried on that flight.
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• several major forecasting studies, adjusted them for comparability and then formulated a composite projection for the purposes of the study.
The following are brief descriptions of the various forecasting methodologies reviewed by the Arizona study. Since these descriptions have been extracted (in order to illustrate the contrast in scope of the various methodologies), the reader should bear in mind that some of the material is included only to clarify how the Arizona Study made the forecasts comparable (e.g., inclusion of non-U.S, traffic).
The Hoeing Company
The Hoeing forecast LHef. 5 Iwas divided into U.S. domestic and international traffic to arrive at the total U.S. civil air carrier traffic.
• Two projections were made for each of these segments on the basis of different forecast growth rates. A "probable" forecast used growth rates that start at approximately 15 percent in 19(>ü to 19(17 and drop to about (i percent in the late lüTO's. A "possible" forecast was based upon growth rates that vary from approximately 17 percent in !i)(»() to a litlie over 8 percent by 1980. To get to total Free \\orld traffic. Hoeing added non-l'.S. forecasts to these totals. The non-U.S, forecasts were based upon growth rates that vary from about 14 percent to (i percent for the "probable" level and from IS percent to H percent for the "possible" level. These two levels of forecast comprise the Hoeing estimates. The "possible" level was found to be closest to the other forecasts examined.
Hoeing checked the consistency of their forecasts with other economic indicators. Specifically, projections of the economic growth rates of the United States and those countries represented in the non-U.S. forecasts were evaluated to determine the ability to support the projected traffic growth. A further check on consistency was made by evaluating the compatibility of the air carrier forecasts with projections for the transportation sector of the overall economy. Although demand elasticities were not used directly in the forecasts, an underlying assumption of moderate fare decreases
•
Since this is one of the few forecasts that contains this information directly, it is used for comparison in the discussion of other forecasts. and continui'd usi« of promotiunal fares was made. They felt that this would bi* necessary to support even the "possible" level of projected growth. The potential market population was elietked against the passengers represented in the foreeasts and the results were determined to be consistent with a continued increase in propensity to travel over the time period.
Douglas Aircraft Company
The Douglas traffic forecast LHef. (ij parallels the Boeing forecast approach in the manner of validating their growth extrapolation. Douglas forecasted U.S. domestic air passenger traffic only, so it was adjusted by adding the Boeing forecast for inti i.iational traffic. Douglas, in comparing the world to the li. S., reached the conclusion that "extensive analysis of the economics of countries other than the United States indicates that the rate of growth of factors contributing to air travel exceed those of the United States." (See Hef, (J, p. 10.) Upon this basis they developed their world forecast. They broke down the world forecast into segments in order to validate the projections for such major categories as North Atlantic traffic and intra-Kuropean traffic.
The net result of the Douglas forecast is a growth rate that is slightly less than that for Boeing over the period. Their validations of the forecast involved the same economic factors used by Boeing. In addition, they looked at U.S. intercity common carrier traffic. They compared their forecast for the air share of intercity travel with projections of total common carrier domestic intercity travel to check for consistency. They also looked at personal income and corporate profits as key factors in the support of continued growth of air travel.
;t.
Kederal Aviation Administration
The KAA forecast Litef. 7 J was developed in support of the supersonic transport (SST) investigations. The forecast for the total certificated air carriers was divided into domestic and international passenger-miles; however, the composite forecast was based upon the traffic forecast for the domestic segment adjusted by the historical relationship between domestic and international traffic. It is unique among the forecasts in that the projected growth rates, which start at about 14 |)ercent per year, decline to around 10 percent |)er year in 1970 and then increase to IJ percent for the remaining years. The reason for Ulis increasing growth rate toward the latter part
of the period is the lower fares occasioned by the introduction of aircraft with lower operating costs during that period.
Other factors included are those related to continued real CNP growth of between 2 to 3 percent per year and continued promotional or reduced fares on currently operating aircraft. The effect of reduced fares on stimulating passenger traffic is still an open question, although estimates of this effect are used explicitly. Some work has been done on trying to estimate the demand elasticity but, as yet, no precise conclusions have been reached LRef. 81 The overall effect of this additional growth in the latter years is to make the KAA forecast the highest of those discussed, except Boeing's "possible" forecast.
Civil Aeronautics Board
Basically, the CAB forecast LRef. 9] involved the development of the statistical relationship between economic indicators and passenger traffic. The primary independent variables used were consumer price index, disposable personal income, population, real disposable personal income, fares, and real fares. As in the FAA forecast, an estimate was made of fare elasticity which was included in the forecast equations.
Separate forecasts of the independent variables were developed or obtained from other sources and the dependent variable, revenue passenger-miles, was then determined for each of the ten years of their forecast. Since this forecast was not on a growth projection basis, it is interesting to compare the percentage growth rates as derived by this method with those used in the other forecasts. For the early years in this forecast, the growth rate was 9. 3 percent and this declined to a closing growth rate of 7. ü percent per year. This is substantially less than the majority of the growth rates used in the other forecasts.
Since this forecast was developed for the domestic trunk air carriers, domestic operations, scheduled service only, it was necessary to inflate the result in order to equate it to total civil air carriers. Since the relationship between the total industry and the domestic trunk carriers has been reasonably stable over the past, the percentage relationship between those two groups during 19(55 was applied to the forecast for the future. This corrected forecast is the lowest of the group for the total air carrier population, which is consistent with the overall lower growth rate which is derived from their forecasts.
IM
Air Transport Association
The ATA forecast LRef. lü] consisted simply of three levels of projected growth rate: 10. 8 percent for the low growth rate, 13.5 percent for the average growth rate, and 16. 2 percent for the high growth rate. The average growth rate gives a forecast that is approximately equal to the Boeing "probable" forecast in the early years but considerably higher in the later years.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Lockheed developed a forecast of air passenger traffic in support of their bid for the SST contract Lfief. 11 j. Their forecast was also used as an input to a simulation model of an airline that they use for measuring markets for new aircraft. Their approach to the forecasting problem was to separate and then forecast U.S. domestic and international traffic. For the U.S. domestic market forecast, they used three methods: (1) a market analysis technique, (2) a citypair analysis, and (.'*) an economic index (GNP) method. The international traffic forecast was based upon an analysis of the relationship between the U. S. forecast and the transAtlantic traffic, plus a trend extrapolation for major market areas of the world.
The basic underlying assumptions of all three approaches in forecasting the domestic traffic include continued growth in the (JNP, continued downward pressure on air fares, increasing propensity to fly, and no major economic or political changes in the world situation. Lockheed's overall forecast is a composite of these three techniques. Although showing some differences for some time periods, they tended to support one another. The forecast for domestic scheduled traffic in the U.S. is adjusted in the same manner as for the CAB forecast and results in a total almost identical to the Douglas domestic forecast plus the Boeing international forecast. It is still somewhat lower than the Boeing "probable" forecast. MoffM AwrnrM a normalizing force is constantly at work to insure an underlying pattern of harmony between capacity and demand, with comcomitant benefits to the "convenience and necessity" of the traveling public.
In the same vein, the Aviation Heport (Ref. 14, p. 1) , (in noting the consistent underestimation as a symptom of poor forecasting in general) points out rather tongue-incheek that at least the error of underestimation, as opposed to overestimation, is "the safe one," as "underestimating RPM's means higher load factors, improved earnings and/or hasty follow-on orders to the manufacturing industry, which has certainly been noted in the past two years."
On the other hand, the May 19(59 issue of Space/Aeronautics (Ref. 1(5) uses ATA data to illustrate current ATC saturation or near saturation of 12 high-density air carrier airports (Fig. 5) which "in almost all cases, have already reached or gone beyond their theoretical annual capacities." According to the ATA, there will be significant peak hour traffic delays at all 12 airports by the mid-'VOs. Thus, one concludes that although underestimation results in higher load factors, improved earnings, and more follow-on manufacturing activity, it unfortunately also results in congestion, inconvenience, and delay for the air traveler due to lack of planning for his needs. It is obvious that continued underestimation to the degree noted above will be critical in its impact on the capability of air terminal and airways facilities to meet the future needs of the air traveler. 
